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Abstract: This study investigates the mispricing of market-wide investor sentiment by exploring 
the relation between sentiment and investor expectations of future earnings.  Prior research argues 
that sentiment-driven mispricing should be most pronounced for hard-to-value firms, such as those 
reporting losses (Baker and Wurgler 2006).  Using investor expectations of future earnings, we 
provide empirical results consistent with this behavioral finance theory.  In particular, we predict 
and find that investors perceive losses to be more (less) persistent during periods of low (high) 
sentiment; that investors perceive profit persistence to be lower (higher) during periods of low 
(high) sentiment; and that the effects appear stronger for loss firms relative to profit firms.  In 
addition, we document predictable cross-sectional variation within losses, with the mispricing 
mitigated for losses associated with activities expected to generate future benefits: R&D, growth, 
large negative special items, and severe financial distress.  Overall, our results document a new 
and important channel—investor expectations of future earnings—to explain sentiment-driven 
mispricing, particularly for loss firms. 
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1.  Introduction 
Extant literature documents that systematic risk is not a complete explanation for observed 
changes in stock prices (Burger and Curtis 2012; Nichols et al. 2017).  Rather, prior literature 
suggests that investor sentiment plays an important role in investors’ information processing, and 
thus induces mispricing (Brown and Cliff 2005; Baker and Wurgler 2006, 2007; Hengelbrock et 
al. 2013; Coulton et al. 2016).  These papers further argue that the compounding effects of being 
hard-to-value and more difficult to arbitrage should make the sentiment effect on stock valuation 
stronger for certain types of firms: those that are small, young, volatile, non-profitable, non-
dividends-paying, extreme growth, or distressed.  While prior literature confirms these effects in 
several settings (Hribar and McInnis 2012; Mian and Sankaraguruswamy 2012; Seyber and Yang 
2012; Kaplanski and Levy 2017), surprisingly limited evidence exists for loss firms.  For instance, 
Mian and Sankaraguruswamy (2012) excludes loss firms from their primary tests, as the paper 
focuses on earnings response coefficients, which are uninformative for firms with negative 
earnings.  Hribar and Mcinnis (2012) and Seybert and Yang (2012) conduct cross-sectional 
analyses on the relation between sentiment and returns on profit verses loss firms, but fail to find 
significant differences between the two groups.  Kaplanski and Levy (2017) examines the 
sentiment effect on analyst forecasts; contrary to expectations under Baker and Wurgler, the paper 
finds that the forecasts of profitable firms are more affected by sentiment relative to those of loss 
firms.   
In this paper, we assess the impact of sentiment on investor expectations of future earnings 
particularly for loss firms.  The valuation process is generally viewed as more difficult for loss 
firms relative to profit firms.  For example, while the market value of profit firms can be derived 
through multiples applied to current earnings, such techniques are infeasible for the negative 
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earnings of loss firms.  Prior research documents that the valuation of loss firms is largely driven 
by investors’ perception of R&D, restructuring charges, and the likelihood of exercising of 
liquidation, each of which involve substantial subjectivity (Joos and Plesko 2005; Darrough and 
Ye 2007; Franzen and Radhakrishnan 2009).  Prior research further suggests that earnings 
forecasts are far less accurate for loss firms relative to profit firms: for example, Hwang et al.  
(1996) shows that the average analyst forecast error for loss firms is about ten times that for profit 
firms.  This suggests greater difficulty for investors to predict the future earnings of loss-making 
firms, which comprise a significant and growing part of the overall market.1  Collectively, this 
suggests it is important to examine both how sentiment maps into loss firms, as well as the relative 
impact of sentiment on the pricing of profit versus loss firms.   
Accordingly, we build on the literature investigating the channels that lead to investor 
mispricing (e.g., Sloan 1996; Baker and Wurgler 2007) and examine the impact of sentiment on 
investors’ valuation of earnings for both profit and (more importantly) loss firms.  Our primary 
outcome measure is the construct by Mishkin (1983), which examines investors’ expected earnings 
persistence (i.e., future earnings given current period’s earnings, denoted 𝑎1
∗) and firms’ actual 
earnings persistence (denoted 𝑎1).  We combine these to investigate the link between sentiment 
and the errors in investor expectations of future earnings (𝑎1
∗ − 𝑎1 ).  Thus, we link a well-
established tool with assessing the effects of sentiment, which enables deeper insights into the 
mechanisms by which sentiment may affect equity pricing.  
Psychology literature suggests that individuals tend to overvalue (undervalue) information 
that confirms (disconfirms) their beliefs (e.g., Edwards 1968; Lord et al. 1979; Nisbett and Ross 
1980; Fiske and Taylor 1991).  Consistent with the prior literature on sentiment, we apply this 
                                                             
1  For example, the percentage of loss firms increases from 2.2% in 1973 to 32.2% in 2015. 
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rationale to the current setting to derive our predictions of how sentiment should affect investor 
expectations of earnings persistence.  We predict that during periods of low sentiment, investors 
will exhibit more pessimism about firms’ future prospects; this will cause a tendency to overweigh 
negative (and underweigh positive) signals of firm performance.  This leads to our expectation that 
during periods of low sentiment, investors expect losses to be more persistent and profits to be less 
persistent relative to their actual persistence.  In contrast, during periods of high sentiment where 
investors exhibit greater optimism, we predict that investors are more likely to perceive current 
losses as less persistent, and current profits as more persistent.   
To examine these expectations, we use quarterly data to capture all earnings 
announcements throughout the year.  We use two specifications for investor expectations: a 
random walk model; and a seasonal random walk model.  The random walk model assumes the 
expected earnings for the next quarter is a function of earnings in the current quarter; the seasonal 
random walk model assumes the expected earnings for the next quarter is a function of earnings 
in the same quarter of the prior year.  Note that we use reported earnings, as opposed to analyst 
forecasts to assess investor expectations, for two primary reasons.  First, this ensures a more 
general representation of loss firms.  In particular, prior research confirms that analyst coverage is 
limited for young, small, and distressed firms (Hou et al. 2012; Li and Mohanram 2014; Keskek 
et al. 2019).  As such, using analysts’ forecasts to proxy for market’s expectations may cause 
sampling biases, and impede our ability to assess a broad sample of loss-making firms.  Second, 
prior research documents that analysts have incentives to bias their forecasts, which may limit 
using such forecasts to capture market expectations (e.g., Francis and Philbrick 1993; Dugar and 
Nathan 1995; McNichols and O’Brien 1997; Lin and McNichols 1998; Richardson et al. 2004; 
Easton and Sommers 2007).   
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Consistent with our predictions, we find that sentiment plays an important role in forming 
investor expectations of future earnings.  Specifically, we document that investors overweigh 
(underweigh) loss persistence in low (high) sentiment periods.  We also find contrasting (albeit 
weaker) evidence for profit firms: investors overweigh (underweigh) profit persistence in high 
(low) sentiment periods.  Statistical comparisons of these effects confirm that the effects of 
sentiment are stronger for loss firms relative to those for profit firms.  These latter findings are 
consistent with prior research suggesting that sentiment-driven mispricing should be more 
prevalent for hard-to-value firms, such as loss firms (Baker and Wurgler 2006). 
To further assess the above average relation, we next investigate whether the mispricing of 
loss persistence varies with characteristics of the reported losses.  Prior research documents 
heterogeneity in how investors view current period losses (Francis et al. 1996; Burgstahler et al. 
2002; Joos and Plesko 2005; Darrough and Ye 2007; Franzen and Radhakrishnan 2009; Li 2011).  
For example, investors differentially price losses for firms having expenditures with potential long-
term pay-offs (e.g., R&D), or for firms likely to return to profits if they decide to liquidate loss-
generating assets and curtail loss-making operations (Hayn 1995; Lawrence et al. 2017).  
Accordingly, we expect that the effect of sentiment in reducing the perceived persistence of 
earnings for loss firms will be mitigated for certain types of losses that may convey positive 
information regarding firms’ future performance: (i) those arising from high R&D expenditures; 
(ii) those for firms exhibiting high growth potential; (iii) those arising from large negative special 
items—including write-downs, restructuring charges, and goodwill impairments; and (iv) and 
those for firms exhibiting severe financial distress.  Prior research argues that across all four 
scenarios, the depressed current earnings can be viewed as transitory, and thus be more likely to 
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reverse in the future.2  Consistent with these expectations, our cross-sectional analyses confirm 
that the mispricing of loss persistence driven by sentiment is attenuated for loss firms with high 
R&D, high growth potential, large negative special items, and severe financial distress.  
This paper makes four contributions.  First, it complements Mian and Sankaraguruswamy 
(2012) by extending their analysis (which focuses on profit firms) to demonstrate that the 
sentiment effect on investors’ valuation of accounting information also occurs for loss firms.   
These insights are important, given the substantial proportion of loss firms in the market, as well 
as the inconclusive evidence of recent studies regarding the strength of the sentiment effect across 
loss versus profit firms (Hribar and McInnis 2012; Mian and Sankaraguruswamy 2012; Seybert 
and Yang 2012; Walther and Willis 2013; Kaplanski and Levy 2017).  Second, recent papers 
provide evidence that the association between stock price and accounting fundamentals has 
weakened at the aggregate level, and varies substantially across different types of firms (Curtis 
2012; Burger and Curtis 2017; and Nichols et al. 2017).  Our study provides a plausible explanation 
that such mispricing may, in part, reflect sentiment-driven mispricing on a large and growing 
subset of firms: those incurring losses.  Third, this study provides evidence of heterogeneity in 
these effects across loss firms; in particular, the sentiment-driven mispricing for loss firms is 
mitigated when losses are associated with activities expected to have a positive impact on firms’ 
future performance: R&D, growth, large negative special items, and severe financial distress.  
Thus, we complement prior research examining how investors condition their perceptions on the 
nature of the reported loss (e.g., Joos and Plesko 2005; Darrough and Ye 2007).  Finally, this study 
contributes to the literature on sentiment-driven mispricing by suggesting a new and important 
channel through which sentiment maps into firm valuation.  Mian and Sankaraguruswamy (2012) 
                                                             
2  Providing tension in this expectation: loss firms with these attributes could face more uncertainty in their future 
operations, and thus be more difficult to value or arbitrage.   
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suggests that investor sentiment affects market pricing by influencing the stock price sensitivity 
per unit of earnings surprise (i.e., earnings response coefficient, or ERC).  Our results reveal that 
sentiment directly impacts investors’ expected future earnings: thus, sentiment not only affects the 
market reaction per unit price of ex post earnings surprise, but also the magnitude of earnings 
surprise through investors’ formation of ex ante earnings expectations.   
Section 2 presents the literature and hypotheses; Section 3 presents the research design; 
Section 4 presents the sample selection and descriptive analyses; Section 5 presents the empirical 
results; and Section 6 presents the additional analyses.  Section 7 concludes. 
2.  Literature review and hypotheses development 
Prior Literature 
This paper builds on two literatures: that examining sentiment and the related role of 
accounting; and that relating to investor expectations of future earnings, in particular, for loss firms.  
Regarding the first, prior research in psychology argues that sentiment plays a significant role in 
how individuals perceive information and make decisions.  Of note, the extant literature provides 
evidence supporting the “confirmation bias” theory: individuals overweigh information that 
supports their beliefs, and dismiss information that does not (Edwards 1968; Lord et al. 1979; 
Nisbett and Ross 1980; Fiske and Taylor 1991).  
Accounting and finance literature introduces the concept of sentiment into capital market 
studies, revealing that investor sentiment is a key input for firm valuation.  Baker and Wurgler 
(2007) finds a positive relation between sentiment and stock returns in the cross-section, 
documenting that sentiment-driven mispricing is more pronounced for hard-to-value and hard-to-
arbitrage stocks.  Subsequent studies show that sentiment affects the pricing of accounting 
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information.  Ali and Gurun (2009) and Livnat and Petrovits (2009) focus on the accrual 
component of earnings, finding that investors tend to overvalue (undervalue) the accrual 
component during high (low) sentiment periods.  Bagnoli et al. (2014) also finds that analysts are 
affected by sentiment and tend to issue more favorable stock recommendations when recent and 
future sentiment is more bullish.  Mian and Sankaraguruswamy (2012) links the mispricing to 
investors’ reaction to per unit of earnings surprise (measured by the earnings response coefficient, 
or ERC); the paper shows that investors place optimistic (pessimistic) valuations on earnings 
surprises during periods of high (low) sentiment.3  Finally, Hribar and McInnis (2012) and Walther 
and Willis (2013) extend Baker and Wurgler (2006, 2007), and argue that analysts’ expectation 
errors drive the association between sentiment and stock returns in a cross-sectional setting.  We 
note two key differences between our study and these two latter papers.  First, we examine the 
market reaction at a more general level: that is, instead of an analysis of analysts’ pricing behavior 
to measure investor expectation, we directly examine sentiment-driven biases for all investors.  Of 
particular note, the use of analyst forecasts as a proxy for investor expectation leads to selection 
biases that move the sample towards larger firms with analyst following.  This is relevant, as loss 
firms tend to be smaller and lack analyst following.  Thus, our use of market implied earnings 
forecast errors enables us to focus the analyses on a broader subset of firms (loss firms) that is 
motivated by prior research to be a set wherein the effects of sentiment are likely exacerbated (i.e., 
                                                             
3  Our study differs from Mian and Sankaraguruswamy (“MS”, 2012) in that the latter paper investigates how 
sentiment affects the ERC, while we investigate how sentiment affects investor expectations of earnings.  The ERC 
and unexpected earnings affect the earnings-return relation through different channels.  We further discuss the 
differences between our analyses and MS in Section 3 (the research design).  Finally, we note that MS fails to find 
significant effects for sentiment on the ERC of loss firms.  However, we highlight that these latter results can 
reflect either that the null is true (i.e., that there is no effect of sentiment on the ERC of loss firms, as concluded 
by MS), or that issues with the model implementation result in the failure to reject (e.g., power, variable 
measurement, and specification; see Wooldridge 2013).  Given prior research’s conclusions that ERC models do 
not perform well for loss firms (e.g., Hayn 1995; Collins et al. 1997), the latter explanation appears at least feasible.  
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hard-to-value firms, as argued in Baker and Wurgler 2006).  Second, we highlight that a primary 
focus of our study is to assess the differential impact of sentiment on the profit and loss 
expectations, and further to examine whether loss heterogeneity leads to variations on the 
sentiment effect.  In contrast, Walther and Willis (2013) uses a pooled sample, and does not 
differentiate these two (key) subgroups.       
The impact of sentiment is prevalent to all types of stocks.  Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) 
presents a model in which asset mispricing persists despite the presence of rational arbitrageurs 
due to their inability to fully implement a timely trading strategy.  However, prior research argues 
that sentiment has cross-sectional effects: that is, the effect should be most pronounced for those 
firms that are harder to value and/or harder to arbitrage.  Baker and Wurgler (2006) provides early 
cross-sectional evidence consistent with this notion, with subsequent studies confirming that high 
volatility, non-dividend-paying, distressed, and extreme growth stocks are more subject to 
sentiment (Lemmon and Portniaguina 2006; Mian and Sankaraguruswamy 2012).  Of note among 
these cross-sectional effects is the lack of focus and inconclusive results for the effect of sentiment 
on loss firms.  For example, Mian and Sankaraguruswamy (2012) excludes observations with 
negative earnings from all primary analyses: the paper focuses on ERCs, which are uninformative 
for loss firms (Hayn 1995; Collins et al. 1997).  In addition, Hribar and McInnis (2012) fails to 
find significant correlations between sentiment and portfolio returns for loss relative to profit 
firms.  Furthermore, Seybert and Yang (2012) examines the sentiment effect on the returns 
centered on management guidance issuance dates, also failing to find differences between loss 
versus profit firms.  Finally, Kaplanski and Levey (2017) examines the sentiment effect on analyst 
forecasts and finds that, contrary to Baker and Wurgler’s argument, sentiment has a greater effect 
on the forecasts of profit relative to loss-making firms.   
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As such, prior research is inconclusive on whether the sentiment effect exists for loss firms, 
and (if so) its effect relative to profit firms.  Compounding these inconclusive results is the 
common implementation using analyst forecasts to assess investor expectations, which creates 
likely sample selection biases that exclude large subsets of loss-making firms.  Accordingly, this 
represents an important gap in the sentiment literature: as Baker and Wurgler (2006, 2007) 
documents, loss firms are harder to value or harder to arbitrage, which suggests that loss firms 
represent an important subset of firms to examine in their own right, and also provide an important 
benchmark relative to profit firms.4   
Regarding the literature examining investor expectations of future earnings, prior studies 
suggest that investors do not predict the persistence of the earnings components rationally.  Sloan 
(1996) and Dechow and Ge (2006) report that investors fail to anticipate the lower persistence of 
either the accruals or special items components.  More importantly, losses have been shown as less 
persistent than profits, making losses less informative about firm value than profits.  For example, 
prior research provides consistent evidence suggesting that the informativeness of losses with 
respect to firms’ future cash flows is limited due to a liquidation option (e.g., Hayn 1995; Berger 
et al. 1996; Subramanyam and Wild 1996; Burgstahler and Dichev 1997; Barth et al. 1998; and 
Lawrence et al. 2017).  
                                                             
4   Baker and Wurgler (2006) posits that loss firms are more sensitive to change of sentiment for two reasons.  First, 
sentiment-sensitive stocks are more difficult to value and thus more subject to speculative demand; and second, 
these stocks are also more risky and costly to arbitrage.  Several other studies adopt this theory, but do not 
distinguish these two channels as both lead to similar predictions on the magnitude of the sentiment effect (Baker 
and Wurgler 2006; Lemmon and Portniaguina 2006; Mian and Sankaraguruswamy 2012).  Following previous 
studies, we do not distinguish the “hard to value” and “difficult to arbitrage” effects, and believe that both are 
captured within our study.  Hayn (1995) and Collins et al. (1999) find that loss firms are more difficult to value 
than profit firms because losses tend to be transitory and less indicative of future performance.  This strongly 
suggests that our comparison of loss versus profit particularly captures the differential sentiment effects on “hard 
to value” and “easy to value” firms.   
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Lower loss persistence also adds uncertainty for analysts and investors to evaluate firms’ 
future performance given current losses.  Hwang et al. (1996) finds that the average analyst 
forecast error for loss firms is about ten times that for profit firms.  Related, Li (2011) examines 
investors’ understanding of loss persistence, finding that investors cannot fully distinguish 
persistent from transitory losses, and instead assume that all losses are transitory.  Our study builds 
upon the findings of Li (2011) by examining the moderating role of sentiment on investors’ 
expectation of earnings (both profit and loss) persistence.  
 
Hypothesis development 
This study investigates the relation between market-wide sentiment and errors in investor 
expectations of future earnings given current earnings.  We measure errors as investors’ perceived 
earnings persistence relative to firms’ actual earnings persistence.  We focus on loss firms and 
profit firms separately, because prior research suggests that sentiment has a differential impact on 
hard-to-value stocks, such as loss firms (Baker and Wurgler 2006).  
Individuals tend to overvalue (undervalue) information that confirms (contradicts) their 
prior beliefs (Edwards 1968; Lord et al. 1979; Nisbett and Ross 1980; Fiske and Taylor 1991).  
Accordingly, we predict that investors tend to overreact to financial information that is consistent 
with their prior sentiment, and conversely underreact to financial information that is inconsistent 
with their prior sentiment.  This leads to our expectation that when investors observe firms 
reporting a loss during periods of low sentiment, they will overweigh the implication of current 
losses on future earnings.  In contrast, when investors observe firms reporting a loss during periods 
of high sentiment, they are more likely to show optimistic expectations of future earnings: that is, 
to view current losses as more transitory and that such firms will more quickly return to 
profitability.  We predict similar, although opposite in sign, associations for profit firms: during 
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low sentiment periods, investors place lower persistence on current profit; and during high 
sentiment periods, investors place higher persistence on current profits.  Taken together, our first 
hypotheses (stated in the alternative form) are: 
H1A  Investors perceive losses as more persistent in low sentiment periods and less persistent 
in high sentiment periods.   
H1B  Investors perceive profits as less persistent in low sentiment periods and more persistent 
in high sentiment periods.   
Note that we benchmark investor expectations of earnings persistence with firms’ actual 
earnings persistence.  That is, we define errors in investor expectations as the difference between 
the perceived versus actual persistence coefficient.  Thus, H1A predicts a negative relation between 
sentiment and errors in investor expectations of future earnings for loss firms.  Similarly, H1B 
predicts a positive relation between sentiment and these errors for profit firms.5 
Next, we examine if the mispricing of loss persistence differs by the nature of the reported 
loss.  In particular, we consider whether heterogeneity in why firms report losses leads to variation 
in how sentiment affects investor expectations of future earnings for such firms.  Extant research 
argues that the sentiment effect should be more pronounced on firms that are hard-to-value or more 
difficult to arbitrage (Baker and Wurgler 2006; Lemmon and Portniaguina 2006; Mian and 
Sankaraguruswamy 2012).   We build on this literature and identify four categories of loss firms 
that satisfy such condition: (i) those with high research and development (R&D); (ii) those with 
high growth potential; (iii) those reporting large negative special items; and (iv) those under high 
financial distress.  On the one hand, investor sentiment can be accentuated for these four categories 
of loss firms since they face more uncertainty in their future operations, and thus are more difficult 
                                                             
5  Restated, we predict that lower sentiment is associated with higher perceived loss persistence relative to actual loss 
persistence; and (conversely) that higher sentiment is associated with lower perceived loss persistence relative to 
actual loss persistence. 
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to value.  As Baker and Wurgler (2006) argue, the sentiment effect should be more pronounced on 
firms that are harder to value and arbitrage.  On the other hand, however, prior research suggests 
these four categories of loss firms are more likely to return to profitability due to their nature of 
the losses.  This leads to an alternative expectation that the sentiment effect may be weaker for 
these loss firms, if investors believe these losses as more likely to be transitory and/or conveying 
positive signals about companies’ future performance.  We consider each category individually.  
Regarding (i)—loss firms with high R&D, US GAAP requires the expensing of (most) 
R&D expenditures.  However, prior research finds that R&D expenditures have a positive impact 
on the valuation for loss firms.  Joos and Plesko (2005) finds that investors understand the different 
valuation implications of the R&D versus non-R&D components of losses, and price the R&D 
component as an asset.  Similarly, Darrough and Ye (2007) documents that investors positively 
value the R&D for loss firms, and that separating R&D from earnings substantially reduces the 
negative relation between market values and earnings for these firms.  Finally, Franzen and 
Radhakrishnan (2009) examines the valuation implications of R&D on profit versus loss firms, 
finding that R&D expenses are positively associated with stock prices for loss firms.  This suggests 
that while R&D has uncertainty regarding its future pay-off, some studies suggest that investors 
perceive R&D as having future pay-offs (on average) for loss firms.   
Regarding (ii)—loss firms with high growth potential, such firms are likely viewed more 
positively than loss firms with low or no growth.  For example, a firm in the early stage of its life 
cycle is more likely focusing on expanding market share than growing its current earnings (e.g., 
consider the historical performance of Amazon).  Similarly, a firm with a first-mover advantage 
or innovative idea is likely to incur large initial investments and thus show low (or negative) 
earnings.  If investors understand firms’ growth strategy and choose to focus more on future 
13 
 
earnings growth potential, then they are less likely to penalize the valuation of such firms despite 
the reporting of current period losses.  
Regarding (iii)—loss firms with large negative special items, we note that special items 
comprise non-recurring items, including impairments, write-downs, and restructurings (Riedl and 
Srinivasan 2010).  Prior research suggests that some special items generate future benefits, such 
as positive future returns in the context of restructuring charges (Francis et al. 1996), and increased 
future earnings (Burgstahler et al. 2002; Cready et al. 2012) consistent with “big bath” reporting 
behavior.  If investors understand the temporary nature of special items and its implication on 
future earnings, then they are less likely to overweigh loss persistence when losses contain a 
significant proportion of special items. 
Finally, regarding (iv)—loss firms with high financial distress, we note that losses cannot 
persist indefinitely: profitability is a maintained hypothesis of a business entity.  Accordingly, such 
firms should rationally take actions to avoid persistent losses such as liquidating loss-generating 
assets (Hayn 1995).  Lawrence et al. (2017) investigates the role of curtailment in explaining the 
lower persistence of losses relative to profit, finding that curtailments are an important determinant 
of lower loss persistence.  If investors perceive that a loss firm in severe financial distress can 
engage in curtailment and turn the poor performance around, then they are likely to provide a less 
negative or even positive valuation.6   
In summary, based on prior research, we posit the sentiment effect on investor expectations 
of loss persistence is attenuated for loss firms with (1) high R&D; (2) high growth potential; (3) 
large negative special items; and (4) high financial distress if the associated losses are viewed as 
                                                             
6  However, we note that investors may overweigh loss persistence during low sentiment periods if they view 
financial distress increasing firm uncertainty.  However, severely distressed firms are likely to be delisted, and thus 
not in our sample.  As such, this may lead the curtailment story instead of the persistent loss story to be more 
evident in our setting. 
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more likely to be transitory and not signaling firms’ future performance.  Ostensibly, such firms 
are likely more difficult to value and/or arbitrage, suggesting the sentiment effect will be 
accentuated for such firms.  Accordingly, we present the following non-directional hypothesis (in 
the null form): 
H2  Mispricing of loss persistence driven by sentiment is not affected by whether the losses 
are associated with high R&D, high growth potential, large negative special items, or 
high financial distress. 
 
 
3.  Research design 
Investor expectations of earnings persistence 
We use the Mishkin (1983) framework to measure actual and expected earning persistence.  
Sloan (1996) introduces this framework into the accounting literature; subsequent studies use it to 
examine the market efficiency of earnings (e.g., Xie 2001; Dechow and Ge 2006; Li 2011).  We 
follow prior research, and measure the earnings persistence between quarter t and quarter t+1 by 
estimating one “forecast equation” and one “pricing equation”: 
Forecasting equation: 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡+1                                         (1) 
Pricing equation:  𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝑏(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡+1 − 𝑎0 − 𝑎1
∗𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡𝑖,) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡+1             (2) 
where ROAi,t (ROAi,t+1) equals earnings before extraordinary items for fiscal quarter t (t+1) scaled 
by total assets at the beginning of quarter t (t+1) for firm i.  Consistent with Li (2011), we define 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡+1 as the buy-hold value-weighted size-adjusted return over the period starting two trading 
days after the earnings announcement date of quarter t and ending one trading day after the 
earnings announcement date of quarter t+1 for firm i.7  
                                                             
7  We alternatively replace the quarterly abnormal returns in Equation (2) by a short-period return, which is the 
cumulative abnormal returns over the three-trading-day window around the earnings announcement date of quarter 
t+1.  Consistent with Baker and Wurgler (2006), the results are insignificant.  This is unsurprising as earnings 
news is released gradually throughout the quarter by analysts and management (i.e., preannouncements, conference 
15 
 
Our key construct—errors in investor expectations of future earnings—is defined as: 
𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑅𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡+1 − 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡+1  
= (𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡) − (𝑎0 + 𝑎1
∗𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡) 
= (𝑎1 − 𝑎1
∗) 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡       (3) 
The error in investor expectations of earnings persistence equals the amount by which investors’ 
expected earnings persistence coefficient (𝑎1
∗ ) deviates from the actual earnings persistence 
coefficient (𝑎1) conditional on current earnings; restated, it is (𝑎1 − 𝑎1
∗).  Our empirical analyses 
use 𝑎1
∗ − 𝑎1  to simplify the exposition: a positive (negative) 𝑎1
∗ − 𝑎1 indicates investors’ 
overvaluation (undervaluation) of earnings persistence.  We focus on 𝑎1
∗ − 𝑎1 versus 𝑎1
∗ because 
both 𝑎1
∗  and 𝑎1  can be affected by sentiment contemporaneously.
8   Under a null of market 
efficiency, 𝑎1
∗ − 𝑎1 = 0: that is, investors’ expected earnings persistence equals actual earnings 
persistence.  Thus, 𝑎1
∗ − 𝑎1 > 0 is consistent with investors overestimating earnings persistence; 
and 𝑎1
∗ − 𝑎1 < 0 is consistent with investors underestimating earnings persistence. 
We highlight that our variable of interest (investor perceived earnings persistence 𝑎1
∗ ) 
differs from the earnings response coefficient (ERC) as follows.  The ERC is the beta coefficient 
on the unexpected earnings (Equation (2) above), and indicates how $1 of unexpected earnings 
maps into stock returns.  Unexpected earnings in the Mishkin model is calculated using a random 
walk model or an earnings persistent model; that is, earnings on t+1 is forecasted using earnings 
on t (Equation (1) above).  In other words, expected earnings on t+1 (Equation (2) above) is 
calculated using actual earnings and an investor perceived earnings persistence coefficient on t.  
                                                             
calls, management guidance, and analysts forecast revisions).  As such, we assume that adjustments of investors’ 
expectations will also occur gradually over a quarter, and thus is unlikely captured by a three-day trading window. 
8  For example, if high sentiment increases the persistence of current profit to the next period earnings, then a high 
𝑎1
∗  may not indicate investors’ over-estimated earnings expectation but rather a rational expectation of the 
underlying growth. 
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Our objective is to test how sentiment affects investor expectations of earnings persistence; that is, 
how sentiment affects 𝑎1
∗ , which then affects the expected earnings (and consequently also 
unexpected earnings) in the pricing model in the Equation (2) above.  In this simple model, 
sentiment directly affects the unexpected earnings component, not the beta/ERC coefficient; the 
latter is the focus of Mian and Sankaraguruswamy (2012).  Critically, we focus on assessing the 
effect of sentiment on the magnitude of unexpected earnings (versus on Beta) as it allows us to (a) 
focus on a component that is less likely subject to the measurement/model concerns of the ERC 
for loss firms; and (b) directly measure a specific component that investors are using in their 
valuation as opposed to the ERC, which combines earnings persistence, risk, growth, and the 
discount rate in the valuation (Collins and Kothari 1989). 
   
Measurement of investor sentiment 
Our primary measure of investor sentiment is the composite sentiment index of Baker and 
Wurgler (2006), updated by prior research.  It reflects five sentiment proxies: the closed-end fund 
discount; the number, and average first-day returns on IPOs; the equity shares in new issues; and 
the dividend premium.  To separate this measure from common economic fundamentals, the index 
is orthogonalized to the following market-wide components: growth in industrial production; the 
growth in durable, nondurable, and services consumption; the growth in employment; and a flag 
for NBER recessions (Baker and Wurgler 2006).  We also use an alternative sentiment measure, 
the University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment, in the sensitivity analyses.  
To examine how sentiment affects investor expectations of quarter t+1 earnings given 
quarter t earnings, we construct a quarterly sentiment measure (𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡) by averaging the monthly 
Baker-Wurgler index from the month immediately after the earnings announcement of quarter t to 
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the month before the earnings announcement of quarter t+1.  We start from the month after the 
earnings announcement of quarter t to capture investor sentiment after the current period’s earnings 
are known; we end in the month before the quarter t+1 earnings announcement to prevent the 
sentiment measure from contamination by the release of quarter t+1 earnings. 
As discussed below, the empirical tests examine the relation between sentiment (𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡) 
and errors in investor expectations of earnings persistence ( 𝛼1
∗ − 𝛼1)  by performing a rank 
univariate analysis, a grouping regression analysis, and a monthly regression analysis.   
 
Univariate analysis 
As sentiment is expected to have a differential impact on profit and loss firms, all analyses 
separately examine loss and profit firms; loss (profit) firms are those with income before 
extraordinary items less (greater) than zero.  We then partition the loss and profit samples into 
quintiles based on the level of investor sentiment: quintile 1 (quintile 5) includes observations in 
the lowest (highest) sentiment periods.  For loss firms, we predict that investors consider losses to 
be more (less) persistent when they are pessimistic (optimistic); this is consistent with a 
significantly positive error (i.e., 𝑎1
∗ − 𝑎1 > 0) in the low sentiment periods, and a negative error in 
the high sentiment periods.  This further leads to an expected negative relation between errors in 
investor expectations of earnings persistence and sentiment across the quintiles.  We predict the 
reverse for profit firms: a significantly negative (positive) 𝑎1
∗ − 𝑎1 during periods of low (high) 
sentiment, and a monotonic increase in 𝑎1
∗ − 𝑎1 as sentiment increases. 
 
Multivariate analysis  
 
Prior literature documents that the mispricing of investor sentiment is more pronounced for 
difficult-to-value firms (D’Avolio 2002; Geczy et al. 2002; Jones and Lamont 2002; Baker and 
18 
 
Wurgler 2006).  Accordingly, we examine the relation between sentiment and 𝑎1
∗ − 𝑎1  in a 
multivariate setting controlling for six firm characteristics that capture difficulty to value: firm size 
(SIZE), measured as the logged market capitalization in quarter t; sales growth (SG), measured as 
firm sales in quarter t minus sales in quarter t-1, divided by sales in quarter t-1; age (AGE), 
measured as the number of years since the firm first appeared on CRSP (assessed to the nearest 
month); dividend payment (DIV), measured as total dividend paid divided by the book value of 
equity in quarter t; stock volatility (VOLA), measured as the standard deviation of daily returns 
over the three months ending in quarter t; and the percentage of tangible assets (PPE), measured 
as property, plant, and equipment scaled by total assets in quarter t (see the Appendix).   
We conduct two alternative regressions: a grouping analysis and a monthly analysis.  For 
the grouping analysis, we rank all loss (profit) observations into 100 groups (and thus 100 
observations).9  For each group, we calculate the mean values of sentiment (denoted 𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇_𝐺𝑡), 
the six control variables, and 𝑎1
∗ − 𝑎1.  We then estimate the following regression:  
𝑎1
∗ − 𝑎1 = 𝑐0 + 𝑐1𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇_𝐺𝑡 + ∑𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿_𝐺𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡                (4) 
As previously, 𝑎1
∗ − 𝑎1 is investor perceived earnings persistence relative to the actual earnings 
persistence (i.e., the errors in investor expectations of future earnings).  𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇_𝐺𝑡 is the average 
Baker and Wurgler (2006) sentiment index from the month after the earnings announcement of 
quarter t to the month before the earnings announcement of quarter t+1 for each of the 100 groups.  
Following H1A, we expect a negative coefficient on SENT_Gt for loss firms, suggesting that 
investors overvalue (undervalue) loss persistence in low (high) sentiment periods.  Following H1B, 
we expect a positive coefficient on SENT_Gt for profit firms, suggesting that investors overvalue 
(undervalue) profit persistence in high (low) sentiment periods.  
                                                             
9  We select 100 groups to ensure sufficient observations within each group to perform the Mishkin test.  Untabulated 
results are unchanged to alternatively using 50 and 150 groups. 
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For the monthly analysis, we group observations by each month/year based on the firm’s 
fiscal quarter end.  This aligns sentiment with errors in investor expectations of future earnings by 
time.  For example, we include all firms with the fiscal quarter ended in March 2000 as one group, 
and for this group calculate the set of 𝑎1
∗ − 𝑎1 by performing Mishkin tests, the means of sentiment 
(denoted 𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇_𝑀𝑡) and the mean values of six control variables (𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿_𝑀𝑡).  Our sample 
spans 1973–2015, with a maximum of 516 (43 years x 12 months/year) monthly observations; our 
analyses use fewer observations due to insufficient sample sizes within certain months to allow 
the Mishkin test to converge.  We perform the following regressions:  
𝑎1
∗ − 𝑎1 = 𝑐0 + 𝑐1𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇_𝑀𝑡 + ∑𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿_𝑀𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡                     (5) 
All control variables are defined as in Equation (4).  As above, we predict a negative coefficient 
on SENT_Mt for loss firms (H1A), and a positive coefficient on SENT_Mt for profit firms (H1B).  
 
Cross-sectional analyses for loss firms 
Finally, we test the mispricing of loss persistence by partitioning losses into four categories; 
these partitions are motivated by expectations that investors view losses heterogeneously.  First, 
firms with high R&D, measured as quarterly observations with R&D scaled by total assets in the 
top quartile; low R&D includes all other observations.  For this analysis, we replace missing R&D 
with zero.  Second, firms with high growth potential, measured as quarterly observations with 
book-to-market ratios in the bottom quartile; low growth includes all other observations.  Third, 
firms reporting large negative special items, measured as quarterly observations with special items 
divided by total assets in the bottom quartile; small (or no) special items include all other 
observations.  Fourth, firms under severe financial distress, measured as observations with a 
financial distress score (calculated annually for the prior fiscal year) in the bottom quartile; low 
20 
 
financial distress includes all other observations.  The financial distress score is estimated from 
the bankruptcy prediction model in Beaver et al. (2012).10, 11 
We then estimate the below grouping (Equation 6) and monthly (Equation 7) regressions:  
𝑎1
∗ − 𝑎1 = 𝑐0 + 𝑐1𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇_𝐺𝑡 + 𝑐2𝑃𝐴𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑡 + 𝑐3𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇_𝐺𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝐴𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑡 +
∑𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿_𝐺𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡         (6) 
𝑎1
∗ − 𝑎1 = 𝑐0 + 𝑐1𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇_𝑀𝑡 + 𝑐2𝑃𝐴𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑡 + 𝑐3𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇_𝑀𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝐴𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑡 +
∑𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿_𝑀𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡         (7) 
In the grouping analysis, we divide each of the partitioned low versus high samples (e.g., 
high R&D and low R&D) into 100 groups based on the level of sentiment; this leads to 200 groups 
of observations used for each cross-sectional analysis.  In the monthly analysis, we group 
observations in each of the partitioned low versus high samples by month/year based on firm’s 
fiscal quarter end.  We define 𝑃𝐴𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑡 as an indicator variable equal to one for the high R&D, 
high growth, larger negative special items, or high financial distress group, and zero otherwise.  
Across both Equations (6) and (7), we predict a non-zero coefficient on the interaction between 
sentiment and 𝑃𝐴𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑡 , consistent with sentiment-driven mispricing (i.e., the negative 
coefficient on 𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡) of loss persistence being stronger (either more positive or more negative) 
for firms characterized as high R&D, high growth potential, large negative special items, or high 
financial distress. 
 
                                                             
10  This model forecasts the risk of bankruptcy as a function of: return on assets; EBITDA divided by total liabilities; 
liabilities to assets ratio; lagged market capitalization divided by the market capitalization of the market index; 
lagged cumulative residual return; and the lagged standard deviation of security returns. 
11  We also follow Li (2011) and partition the loss firms into transitory and persistent losses; however, we fail to find 
significant differences in sentiment effect between these two groups.  
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4.  Sample selection and descriptive analyses 
We obtain quarterly financial-statement data from Compustat, stock-return data from 
CRSP, and the investor sentiment data from Baker and Wurgler (2006) for the period 1973–2015.12  
We require firm-quarter observations to have non-missing data on return on assets for quarters t, 
t+1, and t-3; we also require buy-and-hold stock returns for the quarter t+1.  We exclude 
observations in the top and bottom one percent of all variables.  The sample is 144,765 (468,384) 
firm-quarter observations for the loss (profit) sample.  We include financial firms in our main 
analyses; however, all inferences are robust to their exclusion.   
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for loss (Panel A) and profit firms (Panel B).  We 
rank loss (profit) observations into quintiles based on the average sentiment from the month after 
the earnings announcement of quarter t to the month before the earnings announcement of quarter 
t+1, and report the mean and median of the variables used in the Mishkin test.  In Panel A for loss 
firms, as sentiment increases from the lowest to the highest quintile of sentiment, subsequent mean 
abnormal returns (XRETt+1) decrease from 0.029 to –0.042; this is consistent with investors’ 
overvaluation of high sentiment stocks (Baker and Wurgler 2006; Hribar and McInnis 2012).  We 
next report a decreasing trend for 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 as sentiment increases (from –0.041 in quintile 1 to –0.046 
in quintile 5); 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡+1 demonstrates a similar pattern.  Together, this suggests that sentiment is 
negatively associated with contemporaneous and future firm performance.  The t-test (z-test) 
comparing means (medians) between quintile 1 and quintile 5 reveals significant differences for 
all variables.  These findings extend prior research by showing that sentiment is not only associated 
with future returns, but also with firms’ operating performance. 
                                                             
12  The sample period starts in 1973 as earnings announcement dates are unavailable prior to this point; it ends in 2015 
as this is the last available year for investor sentiment data (downloaded in December 2018).   
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 Panel B presents the summary statistics for profit firms; we fail to find a monotonic change 
in 𝑋𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑡+1 from quintile 1 to quintile 5.  Focusing on the mean difference between quintiles 1 
and 5 for 𝑋𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑡+1 across the loss and profit firms, our results confirm prior evidence suggesting 
that the sentiment-driven mispricing (i.e., the negative relation between sentiment and future 
returns) is stronger for loss firms.  Specifically, Panel A for loss firms reveals a decrease in mean 
abnormal returns in quarter t+1 of 0.071 (0.029 in quintile 1 less –0.042 in quintile 5), while Panel 
B for profit firms reveals a decrease of 0.005 (0.021 in quintile 1 less 0.016 in quintile 5); further, 
Panel B reveals no monotonic change from quintile 1 to quintile 5. 
  
5.  Empirical Results 
Univariate analysis 
 
Table 2 presents the errors in investor expectations of future earnings for each sentiment 
quintile.  Panel A presents the results for the loss firms, and reports the earnings response 
coefficient (b),13 the coefficients on firms’ actual loss persistence (𝑎1) and investors’ expected loss 
persistence (𝑎1
∗), the errors in investors’ expected earnings persistence (𝑎1
∗ − 𝑎1), and chi-square 
z-statistics for the test of 𝑎1
∗ − 𝑎1 = 0.  For the lowest sentiment (quintile = 1), we find that loss 
firms exhibit an actual loss persistence coefficient of 0.597, and a perceived loss persistence 
coefficient of 0.943.  The difference of 0.346 (i.e., the errors in investors’ expected earnings 
persistence) is highly significant (z-stat = 53.87).  This suggests that investors overweigh loss 
persistence during the periods of low sentiment (i.e., they expect losses to be more persistent than 
they actually are).  In the highest sentiment group (quintile = 5), the 𝑎1
∗ − 𝑎1 difference of –0.364 
                                                             
13  The earnings response coefficient increases from 0.659 (1.200) to 0.932 (1.762) for loss (profit) firms as sentiment 
increases from quintile 1 to quintile 5; this is consistent with the findings in Mian and Sankaraguruswamy (2012).  
We do not further investigate the mechanism behind the increased ERC.  
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also is highly significant (z-stat = 150.12); of note, in contrast to the low sentiment finding, this 
latter result suggests that investors underweigh loss persistence during periods of high sentiment 
(i.e., they expect losses to be less persistent than they actually are).  We further observe a 
monotonic decrease in 𝑎1
∗ − 𝑎1 as sentiment moves from the lowest to the highest quintile.  Overall, 
this decreasing pattern is consistent with a negative relation between sentiment and errors in 
investor expectations of future earnings, providing univariate support for H1A. 
Panel B presents results for the profit firms.  We find a significantly negative 𝑎1
∗ − 𝑎1 (–
0.470, z-stat = 184.37) in the lowest quintile, consistent with investors underweighing profit 
persistence during periods of low sentiment.  We find similar undervaluation of profit persistence 
in quintiles 2-4.  In addition, we find that investors overweigh profit persistence during periods of 
high sentiment in quintile 5, though the difference of 0.076 is small in magnitude (z-stat = 9.33).  
Overall, we find a positive relation between sentiment and expectation errors for profit firms; thus, 
we provide some univariate support for H1B.  However, we fail to observe a fully monotonic 
increase in 𝑎1
∗ − 𝑎1 as sentiment increases, suggesting the sentiment effect on profit firms may not 
be as prevalent as it appears for loss firms. 
 
Multivariate analysis 
We next examine the relation between sentiment and the errors in investor expectations of 
future earnings in a multivariate setting.  We first focus on the results of the grouping analysis 
(with variable denoted via _G suffixes).  Table 3 presents the results for loss firms (Panel A) and 
profit firms (Panel B), respectively.  In Panel A for loss firms, Column (1) presents results from 
regressing 𝑎1
∗ − 𝑎1  on sentiment; Column (2) presents results further including the six firm-
specific controls.  For both regressions N = 100, reflecting the ranking of firms into 100 equal-
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sized groups based on the value of sentiment; thus, all variables are mean values from each of the 
100 groups.  We observe a significantly negative coefficient on 𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇_𝐺𝑡  in both the single 
regression (–0.358, t-stat = 4.26) and the multivariate regression (–0.406, t-stat = 3.23).  This 
suggests that investors lower (strengthen) their perception of loss persistence in high (low) 
sentiment periods, consistent with H1A.  Economically, the coefficient of –0.406 in Column (2) 
suggests that a one standard deviation increase in 𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇_𝐺𝑡 is associated with a 0.271 decrease in 
𝑎1
∗ − 𝑎1 (–0.406 * 0.667, the standard deviation of 𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇_𝐺𝑡 for loss firms).  The only significant 
control variable in Column (2) is percentage of tangible assets (–6.230, t-stat = 1.84), indicating 
that investors overweigh loss persistence for firms with higher amounts of tangible assets.   
Panel B presents the grouping analysis results for the profit firms.  In Column (3), the 
coefficient on 𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇_𝐺𝑡 is significantly positive (0.198, t-stat = 3.76); similar results obtain in the 
multivariate regression of Column (4) (0.266, t-stat = 4.69).  Both results are consistent with high 
sentiment strengthening investors’ perception of profit persistence, and thus support H1B.  
Regarding economic significance, the coefficient of 0.266 in Column (4) suggests that a one 
standard deviation increase in 𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇_𝐺𝑡 is associated with a 0.200 increase in 𝑎1
∗ − 𝑎1 (0.266 * 
0.752, the standard deviation of 𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇_𝐺𝑡  for profit firms).  Among the control variables, the 
coefficients on both sales growth and stock volatility are significantly negative, suggesting that 
investors perceive lower profit persistence for higher growth and high volatility firms.   
In Panel C, we compare the magnitude of the sentiment effect on profit and loss firms. As 
the coefficient on 𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇_𝐺𝑡 has a different predicted sign across these two groups, we conduct a 
t-test comparing the absolute value of these two coefficients.  We find that the sentiment effect is 
stronger for loss firms relative to profit firms both within the regression without control variables 
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(i.e., 0.358 in Column (1) versus 0.198 in Column (3); t-stat for difference = 1.73) and that with 
control variables (i.e., 0.406 in Column (2) and 0.266 in Column (4); t-stat = 1.70). 
We next examine the relation between sentiment and errors in investor expectations of 
earnings persistence using the monthly analysis.  While the previous grouping analysis forms 
groups based on the level of sentiment regardless of the time period, the current analysis forms 
groups by aligning sentiment with quarterly earnings announcement date in event time.  Thus, each 
calendar month group has a set of 𝑎1
∗ − 𝑎1, as well as mean values for the six control variables.  
Table 4 presents the results.  In Panel A for the loss firms, both Columns (1) and (2) are 
based on a sample of 355 observations; this represents the number of calendar months for which 
we can obtain 𝑎1
∗ − 𝑎1 from the Mishkin test and the remaining control variables (the _M suffixes 
denote variables calculated within the monthly analysis).  In Column (1), we find a significantly 
negative coefficient on 𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇_𝑀𝑡 (–0.122, t-stat = 2.65); similar results obtain in the multivariate 
regression of Column (2) (–0.141, t-stat = 2.96).  That is, similar to Table 3, the results suggest 
that investors lower (strengthen) their perceptions of loss persistence during periods of high (low) 
sentiment, consistent with H1A.  Regarding the control variables, only the proportion of tangible 
assets is significant (1.612, t-stat = 2.41).  Panel B presents results for the profit sample.  In Column 
(3), we find a significantly positive coefficient on 𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇_𝑀𝑡 (0.124, t-stat = 2.66); similar results 
again obtain in the multivariate regression of Column (4) (0.128, t-stat = 2.54).  Combined, this 
provides evidence that high sentiment increases investor expectations of profit persistence, and 
thus support for H1B.  In Panel C, we compare the coefficient on sentiment between profit and loss 
firms; however, we fail to find significant difference between these two groups. 
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Overall, across our grouping and monthly analyses, we find evidence that investor 
expectations of loss (profit) persistence is negatively (positively) affected by sentiment, with the 
effect appearing to be stronger for loss firms relative to profit firms. 
 
Cross-sectional analyses for loss firms 
Table 5 presents the cross-sectional results for the grouping analysis examining alternative 
partitions of differing types of loss firms.  Panel A shows the results from the model that regresses 
𝑎1
∗ − 𝑎1  only on 𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇_𝐺𝑡 , 𝑃𝐴𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑡 , and 𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇_𝐺𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝐴𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑡 .  In Column (1), 
partitioning on high versus low R&D, the significantly negative coefficient on 𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇_𝐺𝑡 (–0.312, 
t-stat = 4.70) confirms the Table 3 finding that investors overvalue (undervalue) loss persistence 
in low (high) sentiment periods.  In addition, we find a significantly positive coefficient on 
𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇_𝐺𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝐴𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑡  (0.266, t-stat = 2.90), suggesting that the overvaluation of loss 
persistence in low sentiment periods is attenuated for firms characterized by high R&D.  Columns 
(2) – (4) repeat the analysis using as the partitioning variable high growth, large negative special 
items, and high financial distress, respectively.  Focusing on the coefficient for 𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇_𝐺𝑡 ∗
𝑃𝐴𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑡, we find that the overvaluation of loss persistence in low sentiment periods is also 
attenuated for high growth firms in Column (2) (0.287, t-stat = 2.18), and for firms in high financial 
distress in Column (4) (0.200, t-stat = 2.42).  In Column (3) partitioning on large negative special 
items, the coefficient is insignificant (–0.79, t-stat = 0.89).  Panel B repeats the analysis with the 
control variables.  Inferences are similar to Panel A: investors overvalue (undervalue) loss 
persistence in low (high) sentiment periods across all the partitions, and this overvaluation is 
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attenuated (as evidenced in a significantly positive interaction term) for firms characterized as high 
R&D (Column 1), high growth (Column 2), or high financial distress (Column 4).14 
Table 6 repeats these cross-sectional partitions using the monthly analysis; results are 
similar, albeit weaker.  We again find a significantly positive coefficient on the interaction of 
𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇_𝑀𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝐴𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑡  for the high R&D indicator in Column (1) in both the regression 
excluding control variables in Panel A (0.130 t-stat = 2.05), and including controls in Panel B 
(0.125, t-stat = 1.92).  In Column (3), we find that the coefficient on the interaction between 
sentiment and the indicator for large negative special items is significantly positive in both Panel 
A (0.228 t-stat = 2.31) and Panel B (0.188 t-stat = 1.89).  The coefficients on the interaction terms 
are insignificant for either high growth in Column (2), or high distress in Column (4).  Combined, 
the results of Columns (1) and (3) provide some support that the sentiment effect on the mispricing 
of loss persistence is attenuated for firms with high R&D or large negative special items.15   
In summary, the above results suggest that investors consider the nature of the loss in 
assessing its implications for future earnings.  In particular, the results provide support for H2 that 
sentiment-driven mispricing of loss persistence appears attenuated for firms having high R&D, 
and some support of similar attenuation for firms having high growth, large negative special items, 
and high financial distress.     
 
 
                                                             
14  In untabulated analysis, we find that correlation coefficients among the four partitioning variables to be small: the 
highest is between high R&D and high growth (0.226), and the remaining are below 0.080.  Moreover, we note 
that 63% of the loss sample falls within at least one of these partitions, but only 1% satisfies all four categories. 
15  We note that the weaker results for the monthly regressions could reflect fewer observations for each month/year 
group; specifically, the monthly regression have 500-600 groups (versus 100 groups for the grouping regressions).  
Having sufficient observations within each group is crucial to generate reliable coefficients from the Mishkin test.   
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6.  Sensitivity analyses 
Seasonal Random Walk 
The main analysis adopts the Mishkin framework for earnings persistence between quarters 
t and t+1.  We now re-assess our results using a seasonal earnings persistence model between 
quarters t–3 and t+1, using the following regressions (corresponding to Equations (1) and (2)): 16 
Forecasting equation:  𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼2𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−3 + 𝑒𝑡+1     (8) 
Pricing equation:  𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝑐(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡+1 − 𝛼0 − 𝛼2
∗𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−3) + 𝜀𝑡+1    (9) 
All variables are as defined previously, except that 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−3 is the earnings in the same quarter as 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡+1 of the previous year.  We then perform the grouping and monthly analyses as follows: 
𝑎2
∗ − 𝑎2 = 𝑐0 + 𝑐2𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇_𝐺𝑡 + ∑𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿_𝐺𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡       (10) 
𝑎2
∗ − 𝑎2 = 𝑐0 + 𝑐2𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇_𝑀𝑡 + ∑𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿_𝑀𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡      (11) 
Again, 𝑎2
∗ − 𝑎2 represents errors in investor expectations of future earnings between quarters t–3 
and t+1; 𝑎2
∗ − 𝑎2 > 0  ( < 0 ) suggests that investors overestimate (underestimate) earnings 
persistence.  As previously, 𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇_𝐺𝑡 (𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇_𝑀𝑡) is the average sentiment value for each of the 
100 groups (each of the calendar month/year groups). 
Table 7 presents the results, with the grouping analysis in Panel A.  Columns (1) and (2) 
present the results of loss firms, and Columns (3) and (4) that for profit firms.  As expected, we 
find a significantly negative coefficient on 𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇_𝐺𝑡 for loss firms in Column (1) for the regression 
excluding control variables (–0.263, t-stat = 3.03), as well as in Column (2) including control 
                                                             
16  For our primary analysis, we focus on the random walk model between two consecutive quarters due to its higher 
earnings persistence.  Specifically, the earnings persistence coefficients for the consecutive random walk model 
are 0.668 and 0.674 for loss and profit firms, respectively (see Table 2); while the earnings persistence coefficients 
for the seasonal random walk model are much lower at 0.472 and 0.251, respectively. 
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variables (–0.346, t-stat = 2.68).  These results confirm H1A using the seasonal earnings persistence 
model.  However, for the profit firms in Columns (3) and (4) (with and without control variables, 
respectively), 𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇_𝐺𝑡 attains unexpected negative coefficients.  Finally, Panel C presents results 
comparing the coefficients across the loss and profit firms, revealing a significantly higher impact 
of sentiment on loss persistence than profit persistence both when excluding controls (i.e., 
comparing 0.263 in Column (1) to 0.057 in Column (3)) and including controls (i.e., comparing 
0.346 in Column (2) to 0.055 in Column (4)).  
Panel B presents the results for the monthly analysis; these are similar to the Panel A results 
above.  Specifically, for loss firms the coefficients on 𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇_𝑀𝑡 are significantly negative (–0.175, 
t-stat = 3.16 excluding controls; and –0.142, t-stat = 2.47 including controls).  For profit firms the 
coefficients on 𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇_𝑀𝑡 are insignificant.  Finally, Panel C again confirms the effect of sentiment 
on earnings persistence to be larger for loss relative to profit firms.  
 
Controlling for analysts’ earnings forecast error 
Hribar and McInnis (2012) correlates analysts’ forecast errors with temporal variations in 
investor sentiment, finding that the sentiment-driven mispricing largely reflects time-series 
variation in analysts’ earnings forecast error.  If investors understand and follow analysts’ 
recommendation and forecasts, then our results may reflect sentiment-driven analyst biases (as 
opposed to our predicted effects, which relate to sentiment-driven earnings expectations).  
Accordingly, we now control for analyst forecast error, leading to the following modified models: 
𝑎1
∗ − 𝑎1 = 𝑐0 + 𝑐1𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇_𝐺𝑡 + 𝑐2𝐹𝐸_𝐺𝑡+1 + ∑𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿_𝐺𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡              (12) 
𝑎1
∗ − 𝑎1 = 𝑐0 + 𝑐1𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇_𝑀𝑡 + 𝑐2𝐹𝐸_𝑀𝑡+1 + ∑𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿_𝑀𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡             (13) 
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All variables are defined as previously, except analysts forecast error (FE) is the difference 
between quarter t+1 actual earnings and the last analyst consensus forecast before the quarter t+1 
earnings announcement.  𝐹𝐸_𝐺𝑡+1 in Equation (12) is the forecast error in the grouping analysis 
(i.e., the average forecast error for each of 100 sentiment groups); 𝐹𝐸_𝑀𝑡+1 in Equation (13) is 
that in the monthly analysis (i.e., the average forecast error for each of the month/year groups).  
Table 8 presents the results; again, Panel A (Panel B) presents the grouping (monthly) 
analysis.  In Panel A, the coefficients on analyst forecast error (FE) are insignificant in all 
regressions.  However, the coefficient on 𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇_𝐺𝑡 remains significantly negative for loss firms 
excluding control variables in Column (1) (–0.370, t-stat = 4.19) and including control variables 
in Column (2) (–0.426, t-stat = 3.34).  Further, the coefficient is now significantly positive as 
expected for profit firms when excluding control variables in Column (3) (0.252, t-stat = 3.41) and 
including control variables in Column (4) (0.299, t-stat = 3.81).  In Panel B, we again find 
significantly negative coefficients for 𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇_𝑀𝑡 in the regressions for loss firms, and significantly 
positive coefficients for profit firms.  Finally, the analyst forecast error is significantly negative in 
Column (1), and significantly positive in Columns (3) and (4); this suggests that analysts and 
individual investors overestimate the earnings persistence in the same direction.  In Panel C, we 
compare the coefficient on sentiment between profit and loss firms for the grouping and monthly 
analyses, respectively; however, we fail to find significant differences between these two groups. 
Of note, the results suggest that analyst forecast error does not subsume the shifts in 
investors’ earnings expectation: i.e., investor sentiment remains important after controlling for 
analyst forecast error.  Thus, our results suggest that sentiment has a direct impact on how investors 
form future earnings expectation, in addition to the intermediating effect provided by analyst 
forecasts, as argued in Hribar and McInnis (2012). 
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Controlling for growth in the Mishkin model 
Two issues regarding the Mishkin test warrant further discussion.  First, the Mishkin 
analyses do not differentiate between the effects of earnings persistence versus growth.   Therefore, 
a high (low) value of 𝑎1
∗ − 𝑎1 can reflect higher (lower) expected persistence and/or higher (lower) 
expected growth.  To better control for the confounding effect of growth and attribute the sentiment 
effect to expected earnings persistence, we modify our main regressions and control for 
expectations of earnings growth by including the following six growth variables in the forecasting 
and pricing equations: book-to-market; quarterly abnormal returns; sales to assets; changes in sales 
to assets; capital expenditure to assets; and changes in capital expenditure to assets.  Untabulated 
results are qualitatively unchanged for loss firms, and insignificant for profit firms. 
Second, Kraft et al. (2007) discusses the effectiveness of the Mishkin test and finds that 
the omission of some variables from the forecasting and pricing equations can affect inferences.  
Thus, we test the robustness of our results by including seven variables related to future earnings 
as suggested by Kraft et al. (2007): sales; changes in sales; capital expenditures; changes in capital 
expenditures; net operating assets; abnormal returns; and lag return on assets.  Table 9 presents the 
results, with Panel A (Panel B) again presenting the grouping (monthly) analyses.  Results are 
similar to our main findings: loss firms exhibit consistently significantly negative coefficients on 
SENT; profit firms exhibit significantly positive coefficients (in three of four specifications); and 
the comparison reveals the loss firms to exhibit larger effects of SENT relative to profit firms in 
three of four specifications.  Overall, we conclude that our previous findings are robust to 
controlling for the expectation of earnings growth and the additional control variables suggested 
by Kraft et al. (2007).   
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Other Sensitivity Analyses17 
While the sentiment index of Baker and Wurgler (2006, 2007) is used commonly in 
accounting research (e.g., Ali and Gurun 2009; Livnat and Petrovits 2009; Hribar and McInnis 
2012; Mian and Sankaraguruswamy 2012), it may suffer from measurement error.  Accordingly, 
we use an alternative and widely-applied measure of sentiment: the University of Michigan 
Consumer Sentiment.  This monthly index is calculated by the Michigan Consumer Research 
Center, using household interviews regarding investors’ financial well-being as well as their 
outlook for the broader economy.  Prior literature confirms this index as strongly associated with 
investor sentiment (Bergman and Roychowdhury 2008; Seybert and Yang 2012).  Thus, we 
alternatively use the University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment in both the univariate and 
multivariate grouping analysis (Equation 4); untabulated results are similar (though weaker) to 
those presented.  
We also conduct three additional cross-sectional tests.  First, Francis et al. (1996) 
documents that the restructuring charges component of the special items are associated with 
positive future returns, whereas other special items (such as inventory write-offs) are negatively 
associated with future returns.  Accordingly, we repeat our cross-sectional testing by partitioning 
negative special items into restructuring charges, write-downs, goodwill impairments, and other 
special items.  However, we fail to find evidence of differential attenuation effects within these 
four sub-categories.  Second, we conduct an additional cross-sectional test for firms with transitory 
and persistent losses, as defined in Li (2011); however, we again fail to find evidence of significant 
differences in sentiment mispricing between these two subgroups.  Finally, for completeness, we 
                                                             
17  Results for these analyses are available on request. 
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also estimate the Table 5 cross-sectional analyses for the profit firms (i.e., testing whether the 
sentiment effect on investor expectations of profit persistence differs by high/low R&D, high/low 
growth opportunities, etc.).  Our results provide no evidence of such differences for profit firms. 
We also test whether investor expectations of loss persistence are affected by analyst 
forecasts for the next quarter.  Specifically, we create an indicator variable equal to one if analyst 
consensus forecasts show a return to profitability for the forthcoming quarter.  We then test if 
investors expect losses to be less persistent if associated with positive analyst forecasts during low 
sentiment periods.  Results on this interaction are again insignificant. 
Finally, earnings persistence can be contaminated by the fourth quarter earnings, as firms 
are more likely to engage in manipulation in the last fiscal quarter (i.e., Q4) to meet or beat earnings 
targets.18  Accordingly, we repeat our main analyses by excluding Q4 related quarters; this focuses 
the analyses only on the persistence between Q1 and Q2, and Q2 and Q3.  Results are unchanged 
using both grouping and monthly regressions.  
 
7.  Conclusion 
This study documents that sentiment is associated with investor expectations of future 
earnings.  We use the Mishkin (1983) framework to measure investors’ expected future earnings 
given current period’s earnings, which enables examination of how sentiment affects investors’ 
valuation of positive and—more importantly—negative earnings.  The results reveal that investors 
overvalue loss persistence during periods of low sentiment, and undervalue loss persistence during 
periods of high sentiment.  We also find similar (though weaker) results of a converse relation 
                                                             
18  In particular, earnings involving Q4 can have a lower persistence if firms engage in manipulations such as “big 
bath” reporting.  On the other hand, earnings involving Q4 can have a higher persistence if firms engage in income 
smoothing activities.  From investors’ perspective, if they anticipate the lower (higher) earnings persistence related 
to Q4, they may adjust their assessment of earnings persistence accordingly.   
34 
 
using profit observations: investors overvalue (undervalue) profit persistence during periods of 
high (low) sentiment.  We further document that the effects of sentiment on earnings persistence 
appear stronger for loss relative to profit firms.  These findings extend Mian and 
Sankaraguruswamy (2012) by providing direct evidence that the sentiment effect is stronger for 
loss firms, consistent with expectations in Baker and Wurgler (2006, 2007) that the sentiment 
effects should be most pronounced for firms that are hard-to-value and difficult to arbitrage (such 
as loss firms).  We also show predictable variation in sentiment-driven mispricing for loss firms: 
the effect is attenuated if the losses are associated with high R&D, high growth potential, larger 
negative special items, and severe financial distress, all of which are suggestive of improved future 
performance.  Overall, these results reveal a new channel for sentiment-driven mispricing: while 
Mian and Sankaraguruswamy (2012) shows that the positive relation between sentiment and ERC 
is a result of its impact on market reaction to per unit of earnings, our results suggest that the 
mispricing can be caused by the magnitude of earnings surprises through investors’ formation of 
earnings expectations.  Finally, our study complements Hribar and McInnis (2012) by capturing 
investor expectations on future earnings using the Mishkin framework instead of relying on analyst 
forecasts, which do not separate expected earnings persistence from growth and can also reflect 
analysts’ behavioral biases.  
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Appendix 
Variable Definitions 
Main variables (Tables 1 and 2) 
       
SENTt  the average Baker and Wurgler (2006) sentiment index from the month after earnings 
announcement of quarter t to the month before the earnings announcement of quarter t+1; 
 
ROAt firm i’s income before extraordinary items for quarter t, divided by total assets at the 
beginning of quarter t; 
 
ROAt+1 firm i’s income before extraordinary items for quarter t+1, divided by total assets at the 
beginning of quarter t+1; 
 
XRETt+1  firm i's value-weighed abnormal returns over the period, starting two trading days after the 
earnings announcement date of quarter t and ending one trading day after the earnings 
announcement date of quarter t+1; 
 
a1 the actual earnings persistence coefficient between quarter t and quarter t+1; 
 
a1* the expected earnings persistence coefficient between quarter t and quarter t+1, obtained 
from the Mishkin test; 
 
Variables used in the grouping regression (Table 3) 
    
a1 the actual earnings persistence coefficient between quarter t and quarter t+1 for each of the 
100 groups; the 100 groups are equally formed based on SENTt; 
 
a1* the expected earnings persistence coefficient between quarter t and quarter t+1, obtained 
from the Mishkin test for each of the 100 groups;  
 
SENT_Gt  the average SENTt for each of the 100 groups;  
 
SIZE_Gt the average log of market capitalization for each of the 100 groups; market capitalization is 
defined as firm i’s price per share at the end of quarter t multiplied by the number of shares 
outstanding in quarter t; 
 
SG_Gt the average sales growth for each of the 100 groups; sales growth is defined as firm i’s sales 
in quarter t minus sales in quarter t-1 divided by sales in quarter t-1; 
 
AGE_Gt the average number of years since the firm first appeared on CRSP, measured to the nearest 
month for each of the 100 groups;  
 
DIV_Gt the average total dividend in quarter t divided by the book value of equity in quarter t for 
each of the 100 groups;  
 
VOLA_Gt the average standard deviation of daily returns over the three months in quarter t for each 
of the 100 groups;  
 
PPE_Gt the average property, plant, and equipment in quarter t, divided by total assets in quarter t 
for each of the 100 groups; 
 
Variables used in the monthly regression (Table 4) 
    
a1 the actual earnings persistence coefficient between quarter t and quarter t+1 for each of the 
calendar month/year group;  
 
a1* the expected earnings persistence coefficient between quarter t and quarter t+1, obtained 
from the Mishkin test for each of the calendar month/year group;  
 
SENT_Mt  the average SENTt for each of the calendar month/year group; 
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SIZE_Mt the average log market capitalization for each of the calendar month/year group; market 
capitalization is defined as firm i’s price per share at the end of quarter t multiplied by the 
number of shares outstanding in quarter t; 
 
SG_Mt the average sales growth for each of the calendar month/year group; sales growth is defined 
as firm i’s sales in quarter t minus sales in quarter t-1, divided by sales in quarter t-1; 
 
AGE_Mt the average number of years since the firm first appeared on CRSP, measured to the nearest 
month for each of the calendar month/year group; 
 
DIV_Mt the average total dividend in quarter t, divided by the book value of equity in quarter t for 
each of the calendar month/year group; 
 
VOLA_Mt the average standard deviation of daily returns over the three months in quarter t for each 
of the calendar month/year group;  
 
PPE_Mt the average property, plant, and equipment in quarter t, divided by total assets in quarter t 
for each of the calendar month/year group; 
 
Variables used in the cross-sectional analyses (Tables 5 and 6) 
RDt an indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i’s R&D in quarter t divided by total assets in quarter 
t is in the top quartile (high R&D observations), and 0 otherwise; missing R&D are set to 
zero; 
 
GROWTHt an indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i’s book value of equity in quarter t divided by 
market capitalization in quarter t is in the bottom quartile (high growth observations), and 
0 otherwise; 
 
SPIt an indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i’s special items in quarter t divided by total assets 
in quarter t is in the bottom quartile (large negative special items observations), and 0 
otherwise; 
  
DISTRESSt an indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i’s financial distress score calculated annually for 
the prior fiscal year is in the bottom quartile (high financial distress observations), and 0 
otherwise; financial distress score is calculated using the estimated regression coefficients 
from the bankruptcy prediction model in Beaver et al. (2012). The prediction model 
forecasts the risk of bankruptcy as a function of return on assets, EBITDA divided by total 
liabilities, liabilities to assets ratio, lagged market capitalization divided by the market 
capitalization of the market index, lagged cumulative residual return, and the lagged 
standard deviation of security returns; 
  
Variables used in the additional analysis (Tables 7 and 8) 
ROAt-3 firm i’s income before extraordinary items for quarter t-3, divided by total assets at the 
beginning of quarter t-3; 
 
a2 the actual earnings persistence coefficient between quarter t-3 and quarter t+1;  
 
a2* the expected earnings persistence coefficient between quarter t-3 and quarter t+1 obtained 
from the Mishkin test;  
 
FE_Gt+1 the actual earnings in quarter t+1 minus the last analyst consensus forecast for quarter t+1 
for each of the 100 groups; and 
 
FE_Mt+1 the actual earnings in quarter t+1 minus the last analyst consensus forecast for quarter t+1 
for each of the calendar month/year group. 
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TABLE 1  
Descriptive statistics of key variables by sentiment quintiles 
 
Panel A: Loss firms      
 N SENTt XRETt+1 ROAt ROAt+1 
Rank by SENTt Mean Median  Mean Median  Mean Median  Mean Median  
1 29,323 –0.561 –0.527 0.029 –0.013 –0.041 –0.017 –0.032 –0.010 
2 28,479 –0.062 –0.044 –0.033 –0.053 –0.041 –0.019 –0.033 –0.012 
3 29,023 0.151 0.142 –0.036 –0.054 –0.041 –0.019 –0.033 –0.012 
4 28,980 0.481 0.486 –0.042 –0.059 –0.042 –0.020 –0.033 –0.012 
5 28,960 1.321 1.028 –0.042 –0.056 –0.046 –0.021 –0.040 –0.015 
Total Obs. 144,765 0.265 0.142 –0.025 –0.047 –0.042 –0.019 –0.034 –0.012 
        
  
RANK5 – RANK1 1.881 1.555 –0.071 –0.044 –0.005 –0.004 –0.008 –0.005 
t-stat  439.96 209.07 29.13 25.69 10.46 16.07 15.51 13.89 
p-value  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Panel B: Profit firms   
  
 N SENTt XRETt+1 ROAt ROAt+1 
Rank by SENTt Mean Median  Mean Median  Mean Median  Mean Median  
1 94,247 –0.766 –0.571 0.021 0.003 0.016 0.013 0.013 0.012 
2 93,131 –0.067 –0.052 –0.006 –0.013 0.016 0.012 0.013 0.011 
3 93,548 0.169 0.162 –0.001 –0.009 0.017 0.013 0.013 0.011 
4 93,935 0.495 0.496 0.002 –0.005 0.017 0.013 0.013 0.012 
5 93,523 1.191 0.879 0.016 0.006 0.017 0.013 0.013 0.012 
Total Obs. 468,384 0.204 0.162 0.006 -0.004 0.017 0.013 0.013 0.011 
        
  
RANK5 – RANK1 1.956 1.450 –0.005 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 
t-stat  749.45 375.27 5.63 1.72 11.76 11.87 0.79 2.20 
p-value  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.43 0.03 
 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for the main variables.  Panel A (Panel B) presents the summary 
statistics for loss (profit) firms.  Loss (profit) firms are those with income before extraordinary items less 
than zero (greater than zero).  Both loss and profit firms are ranked into quintiles based on the average 
Baker and Wurgler (2006) sentiment index from the month after earnings announcement of quarter t to the 
month before the earnings announcement of quarter t+1 (SENTt).  Rank 1 (Rank 5) includes firm-quarter 
observations in the lowest (highest) sentiment periods.  All variables are defined in the Appendix.  
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TABLE 2    
Univariate analysis  
 
Rank by SENTt N 
 
Beta 
b 
Actual 
Persistence 
a1 
Expected 
Persistence 
a1* a1* – a1 z-stat 
Panel A: Loss firms 
1  29,323 0.659 0.597 0.943 0.346 53.87*** 
2 28,479 0.766 0.710 0.667 –0.043 1.19 
3 29,023 0.700 0.710 0.516 –0.194 20.75*** 
4 28,980 0.798 0.667 0.436 –0.231 34.84*** 
5 28,960 0.932 0.665 0.300 –0.364 150.12*** 
All observations 144,765 0.794 0.668 0.540 –0.128 58.46*** 
Panel B: Profit firms 
1 94,247 1.200 0.669 0.200 –0.470 184.37*** 
2 93,131 1.630 0.667 0.405 –0.262 110.78*** 
3 93,548 1.636 0.661 0.325 –0.336 193.99*** 
4 93,935 1.725 0.694 0.582 –0.112 22.25*** 
5 93,523 1.762 0.685 0.761 0.076 9.33*** 
All observations 468,384 1.589 0.674 0.472 –0.202 298.53*** 
 
This table presents univariate analysis between sentiment and errors in investor expectations of earnings 
persistence.  Panel A (Panel B) presents the results for loss (profit) firms.  Loss (profit) firms are those with 
income before extraordinary items less than zero (greater than zero).  b represents the earnings response 
coefficient, a1 represents the actual earnings persistence coefficient, and a1* represents investors’ expected 
earnings persistent coefficient; both are for quarter t to t+1, and obtained from the Mishkin test.  Both loss 
and profit firms are ranked into quintiles based on the average Baker and Wurgler (2006) sentiment index 
from the month after earnings announcement of quarter t to the month before the earnings announcement 
of quarter t+1 (SENTt).  Rank 1 (Rank 5) includes firm-quarter observations in the lowest (highest) 
sentiment periods.   *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.  
All variables are defined in the Appendix. 
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TABLE 3 
Multivariate analysis: grouping regressions 
 
Regression: 
 
Panel A: Loss firms       Panel B: Profit firms     
 Variable Pred Sign Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Pred Sign Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Intercept  
0.023 (0.36) 6.083 (1.30)  –0.278 (6.90)*** 3.091 (0.84) 
SENT_Gt – –0.358 (4.26)*** –0.406 (3.23)*** + 0.198 (3.76)*** 0.266 (4.69)*** 
SIZE_Gt    –0.255 (1.26)    –0.063 (0.36) 
SG_Gt    –3.763 (1.51)    –7.364 (2.48)** 
AGE_Gt    –0.042 (0.05)    –0.265 (0.48) 
DIV_Gt    109.449 (0.47)    413.160 (0.70) 
VOLA_Gt    5.906 (0.58)    –31.583 (2.75)*** 
PPE_Gt    –6.230 (1.84)*    –1.573 (0.63) 
Adj. 𝑅2  0.144 0.194  0.114 0.187 
N  100 100  100 100 
Panel C: Comparison between loss and profit firms 
 t-stat  
Without control variables: |Coeff (SENT_Gt)loss | > |Coeff (SENT_Gt)profit|    (1.73) ** 
With control variables:      |Coeff (SENT_Gt)loss | > |Coeff (SENT_Gt)profit| (1.70) ** 
 
This table presents grouping regressions of the relation between sentiment and the errors in investor expectations of earnings persistence (i.e., 𝑎1
∗ −
𝑎1).  Panel A (Panel B) presents the results for loss (profit) firms.  Loss (profit) firms are those with income before extraordinary items less than 
zero (greater than zero).  The initial sample consists of 144,765 loss (468,384 profit) firm-quarter observations, spanning 1973-2015.  The loss (profit) 
sample is ranked equally into 100 groups based on the level of SENTt , and then the Mishkin test is performed for each group.  This procedure 
generates 100 values (1 for each group) of a1* – a1, the mean value of sentiment, and the mean values of six control variables.  Panel C examines the 
difference in the sentiment coefficients between profit and loss firm regressions.  Because the coefficients have different predicted signs, we compare 
the absolute value of the coefficients.  *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, using two-tailed tests.  
The key experimental variable is bolded.  All variables are defined in the Appendix; the _G suffix denotes variables for the grouping analysis.  
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TABLE 4 
Multivariate analysis: monthly regressions 
 
Regression: 
 
Panel A: Loss firms        Panel B: Profit firms     
 Variable 
Predicted 
Sign Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat 
Predicted 
Sign Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Intercept  –0.174 (4.74)*** 0.725 (0.75)  –0.230 (6.03)*** –1.727 (0.97) 
SENT_Mt –  –0.122 (2.65)*** –0.141 (2.96)*** + 0.124 (2.66)*** 0.128 (2.54)** 
SIZE_Mt    –0.078 (1.69)    0.010 (0.12) 
SG_Mt    0.309 (0.56)    –2.581 (2.42)** 
AGE_Mt    –0.100 (0.55)    0.501 (1.91) 
DIV_Mt    99.525 (1.24)    103.039 (0.51) 
VOLA_Mt    5.340 (1.44)    15.624 (2.55)** 
PPE_Mt    1.612 (2.41)**    –1.134 (0.54) 
Adj. 𝑅2  0.016 0.064  0.013 0.052 
N  355 355  395 395 
Panel C: Comparison between loss and profit firms   
 t-stat  
Without control variables: |Coeff (SENT_Gt)loss | > |Coeff (SENT_Gt)profit|    (0.03)  
With control variables:      |Coeff (SENT_Gt)loss | > |Coeff (SENT_Gt)profit| (0.60)  
 
This table presents monthly regressions of the relation between sentiment and the errors in investor expectations of earnings persistence (𝑎1
∗ − 𝑎1).  
Panel A (Panel B) presents the results for loss (profit) firms.  Loss (profit) firms are those with income before extraordinary items less than zero 
(greater than zero).  The initial sample consists of 144,765 loss (468,384 profit) firm-quarter observations, spanning 1973-2015.  The loss (profit) 
sample is divided into calendar month/year groups based on firms’ fiscal quarter end; the Mishkin test then is performed for each group.  This 
procedure generates one of the following for each calendar month/year group: a1* – a1, the mean value of sentiment, and the mean values of six 
control variables.  Thus, the number of groups depends on the number of calendar month/years with sufficient observations for the Mishkin test.  
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Panel C examines the difference in the sentiment coefficients between profit and loss firms.  Because the coefficients have different predicted signs, 
we compare the absolute value of the coefficients.  *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, using 
two-tailed tests.  The key experimental variable is bolded.  All variables are defined in the Appendix; the _M suffix denotes variables constructed 
for the monthly analysis. 
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TABLE 5 
Cross-sectional analysis: grouping regressions  
 
Regression:  
 
PARTITIONt = 
High R&D High Growth Large Negative SPI High Distress 
Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: Excluding control variables (N = 200 for all regressions)            
Intercept  –0.158 (3.15)*** 0.085 (1.22) –0.179 (3.78)*** –0.088 (2.05)** 
SENT_Gt – –0.312 (4.70)*** –0.387 (4.23)*** –0.210 (3.38)*** –0.268 (4.89)*** 
PARTITIONt  –0.154 (2.17)** –0.330 (3.28)*** 0.227 (3.31)*** –0.055 (0.86) 
SENT_Gt x PARTITIONt + 0.266 (2.90)*** 0.287 (2.18)** –0.079 (0.89) 0.200 (2.42)** 
Adj. 𝑅2  0.098 0.108 0.167 0.049 
Panel B: Including control variables (N = 200 for all regressions)            
Intercept  –0.055 (0.02) 0.430 (0.14) –2.600 (1.02) –3.079 (1.47) 
SENT_Gt – –0.363 (4.84)*** –0.529 (5.18)*** –0.272 (3.48)*** –0.247 (3.61)*** 
PARTITIONt  –0.384 (1.12) –0.351 (2.06)** 0.268 (2.64)*** –0.158 (1.71)* 
SENT_Gt x PARTITIONt + 0.225 (2.36)** 0.260 (1.93)* –0.082 (0.90) 0.156 (1.72)* 
SIZE_Gt  –0.019 (0.20) 0.023 (0.17) 0.111 (1.00) 0.078 (0.87) 
SG_Gt  0.246 (0.24) –3.489 (2.23)** –0.806 (0.70) –1.019 (0.94) 
AGE_Gt  –0.151 (0.46) –0.787 (1.56) –0.266 (0.74) 0.266 (0.80) 
DIV_Gt  –139.239 (1.20) 62.640 (0.55) 60.521 (0.53) –89.388 (1.05) 
VOLA_Gt  17.538 (3.36)*** 17.054 (2.53)** 7.563 (1.32) 15.023 (2.91)*** 
PPE_Gt  0.025 (0.01) 0.741 (0.34) 2.181 (1.35) 1.450 (1.08) 
Adj R2   0.143 0.180 0.168 0.145 
 
This table presents grouping regressions examining cross-sectional variation on the relation between sentiment and the errors in investor expectations 
of loss persistence (𝑎1
∗ − 𝑎1).  Four partitions are examined: high/low R&D (Column 1); high/low growth opportunity using book-to-market ratios 
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(Column 2); large negative/small negative or zero special items (Column 3); and high/low financial distress (Column 4).  Panel A and Panel B 
present the results with and without control variables, respectively.  The initial sample consists of 144,765 loss firm-quarter observations, spanning 
1973-2015.  The observations within the partitions are as follows: high versus low R&D (36,191/108,574); high versus low growth opportunities 
(38,332/106,433); large negative special items versus small negative or zero special items (40,483/104,282); and high versus low financial distress 
(29,230/87,685).  The loss sample is first split based on the cross-sectional variable; each partition (e.g., high R&D observations) is then ranked 
equally into 100 groups based on the level of SENTt,; and the Mishkin test is performed for each group.  This procedure generates one set of 𝑎1
∗ − 𝑎1, 
the mean value of sentiment, and the mean values of six control variables for each partition group (e.g., high R&D observations).  For example, for 
the R&D partition regressions, 100 sets of 𝑎1
∗ − 𝑎1 and the mean values of six control variables are obtained from high R&D observations, and 100 
sets of 𝑎1
∗ − 𝑎1 and the mean values of six control variables are obtained from low R&D observations; regressions are then run using a total of 200 
observations.  *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, using two-tailed tests.  The key experimental 
variables are bolded.  All variables are defined in the Appendix; the _G suffix denotes variables constructed for the grouping analysis. 
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TABLE 6 
Cross-sectional analysis: monthly regressions  
 
Regression:  
 
PARTITIONt = 
High R&D High Growth Large Negative SPI High Distress 
Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: Excluding control variables           
Intercept  –0.181 (6.69)*** –0.168 (3.14)*** –0.144 (2.83)*** –0.144 (2.57)** 
SENT_Mt – –0.121 (3.37)*** –0.039 (0.60) –0.195 (3.10)*** –0.088 (1.23) 
PARTITIONt  0.055 (1.27) –0.072 (0.87) 0.020 (0.27) –0.116 (1.41) 
SENT_Mt x PARTITIONt + 0.130 (2.05)** 0.073 (0.66) 0.228 (2.31)** 0.027 (0.26) 
Adj. 𝑅2  0.024 0.001 0.010 0.002 
N  648 707 733 718 
Panel B: Including control variables            
Intercept  0.583 (1.02) –0.854 (0.82) 1.621 (1.66) 1.097 (1.13) 
SENT_Mt – –0.112 (3.04)*** –0.046 (0.69) –0.177 (2.72)*** –0.086 (1.18) 
PARTITIONt  0.107 (1.25) –0.091 (0.93) 0.144 (1.68)* –0.207 (2.12)** 
SENT_Mt x PARTITIONt + 0.125 (1.92)* 0.071 (0.64) 0.188 (1.89)* –0.013 (0.13) 
SIZE_Mt  –0.046 (1.72)* 0.002 (0.05) –0.109 (2.33)** –0.070 (1.47) 
SG_Mt  0.171 (0.72) 0.504 (1.08) –0.144 (0.30) –0.697 (1.32) 
AGE_Mt  –0.009 (0.10) 0.044 (0.26) –0.074 (0.45) –0.072 (0.41) 
DIV_Mt  –68.213 (1.82)* 18.546 (0.37) 22.815 (0.36) 109.265 (2.20)** 
VOLA_Mt  0.568 (0.28) 2.512 (0.66) 2.060 (0.57) 1.768 (0.49) 
PPE_Mt  0.394 (0.99) 1.536 (2.66)*** 0.828 (1.32) 0.111 (0.18) 
Adj R2   0.030 0.003 0.023 0.013 
N  648 707 733 718 
 
49 
 
This table presents monthly regressions examining cross-sectional variation on the relation between sentiment and the errors in investor expectations 
of loss persistence (𝑎1
∗ − 𝑎1).  Four partitions are examined: high/low R&D (Column 1); high/low growth opportunity using book-to-market ratios 
(Column 2); large negative/small negative or zero special items (Column 3); and high/low financial distress (Column 4).  Panel A and Panel B 
present the results with and without control variables, respectively.  The initial sample consists of 144,765 loss (468,384 profit) firm-quarter 
observations, spanning 1973-2015.  The observations within the partitions are as follows: high versus low R&D (36,191/108,574); high versus low 
growth opportunities (38,332/106,433); large negative special items versus small negative or zero special items (40,483/104,282); and high versus 
low financial distress (29,230/87,685). The loss sample is first split based on the cross-sectional variable; each partition (e.g., high R&D observations) 
is then divided into calendar month/year groups based on the firms’ fiscal quarter ended month; and the Mishkin test is performed for each calendar 
month/year group.  This procedure generates one set of 𝑎1
∗ − 𝑎1 , the mean value of sentiment, and the mean values of six control variables for each 
partition group (e.g., high R&D observations).  For example, for the R&D partition regressions, 276 sets of 𝑎1
∗ − 𝑎1 and the mean values of six 
control variables are obtained from high R&D observations, and 276 sets of 𝑎1
∗ − 𝑎1 and the mean values of six control variables are obtained from 
low R&D observations; regressions are then run using a total of 552 observations.  *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 
0.01 levels, respectively, using two-tailed tests.  The key experimental variables are bolded.  All variables are defined in the Appendix; the _M suffix 
denotes variables constructed for the monthly analysis. 
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TABLE 7 
Sensitivity analysis: seasonal random walk  
 
  
Loss firms   Profit firms 
  Pred Sign Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Pred Sign Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Panel A: Grouping regression                 
Intercept  0.090 (1.37) 11.841 (2.42)  0.119 (7.20) –0.552 (0.35) 
SENT_Gt – –0.263 (3.03)*** –0.346 (2.68)*** + –0.057 (2.56)** –0.055 (2.19)** 
Controls  No Yes  No Yes 
Adj. 𝑅2  0.076 0.111  0.052 0.054 
N   100 100  100 100 
Panel B: Monthly regression                 
Intercept  0.004 (0.08) 2.991 (2.63)  0.122 (3.96) 1.754 (1.21) 
SENT_Mt – –0.175 (3.16)*** –0.142  (2.47)** + –0.014 (0.38) –0.003 (0.06) 
Controls  No Yes  No Yes 
Adj. 𝑅2  0.022 0.086  0.001 0.001 
N   400 400  456 456 
Panel C: Comparison between loss and profit firms             
  t-stat  
Grouping Without control variables: |Coeff (SENT_Gt)loss  | > |Coeff (SENT_Gt)profit|    (2.33) **  
 With control variables:      |Coeff (SENT_Gt)loss  | > |Coeff (SENT_Gt)profit|    (2.61) ***  
Monthly Without control variables: |Coeff (SENT_Mt)loss  | > |Coeff (SENT_Mt)profit|    (2.07) **  
 With control variables:      |Coeff (SENT_Mt)loss  | > |Coeff (SENT_Mt)profit|    (2.31) **  
 
This table presents regressions of the relation between sentiment and the errors in investor expectations of earnings persistence using a seasonal 
random walk model to assess earnings persistence, measured using quarter t–3 and t+1.  Panels A and B present the results for the grouping and 
monthly regressions, respectively; Panel C examines the difference in the sentiment coefficients between profit and loss firms.  Loss (profit) firms 
are those with income before extraordinary items less than zero (greater than zero).  The initial sample consists of 144,765 loss (468,384 profit) 
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firm-quarter observations, spanning 1973-2015.  *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, using two-
tailed tests.  The key experimental variables are bolded.  All variables are defined in the Appendix. 
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TABLE 8 
Sensitivity analysis: controlling for analysts’ earnings forecast error 
 
  
Loss firms   Profit firms 
  Pred Sign Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Pred Sign Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Panel A: Grouping regression 
                
Intercept  0.009 (0.05) 8.319 (1.62)  –0.237 (2.73)*** 0.331 (0.08) 
SENT_Gt – –0.370 (4.19)*** –0.426 (3.34)*** + 0.252 (3.41)*** 0.299 (3.81)*** 
FE_Gt+1  –0.022 (0.13) 0.100 (0.42)  –0.792 (1.17) –0.861 (1.01) 
Controls  No Yes  No Yes 
Adj. 𝑅2  0.136 0.193  0.184 0.207 
N   100 100  100 100 
Panel B: Monthly regression 
                
Intercept  –0.367 (4.74) 2.082 (1.00)  –0.344 (5.72)*** –1.400 (0.48) 
SENT_Mt – –0.130 (1.67)* –0.239 (2.86)*** + 0.150 (1.94)* 0.185 (2.36)** 
FE_Mt+1  –0.149 (3.31)*** –0.037 (0.57)  1.324 (3.54)*** 0.722 (1.65)* 
Controls  No Yes  No Yes 
Adj. 𝑅2  0.034 0.061  0.033 0.064 
N   334 334  350 350 
Panel C: Comparison between loss and profit firms 
      
  t-stat  
Grouping Without control variables: |Coeff (SENT_Gt)loss | > |Coeff (SENT_Gt)profit|    (0.66)  
 With control variables:      |Coeff (SENT_Gt)loss | > |Coeff (SENT_Gt)profit|    (0.89)  
Monthly Without control variables: |Coeff (SENT_Mt)loss | > |Coeff (SENT_Mt)profit|    (0.15)  
 With control variables:      |Coeff (SENT_Mt)loss | > |Coeff (SENT_Mt)profit|    (0.10)  
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This table presents a regression analysis of the relation between sentiment and the errors in investor expectations of earnings persistence controlling 
for analysts forecast errors.  Analysts forecast errors are defined as actual earnings per share minus the last consensus forecast before the 
announcement of quarter t+1 earnings.  Panels A and B present the results for grouping regressions and monthly regressions, respectively; Panel C 
examines the difference in the sentiment coefficients between profit and loss firms.  Loss (profit) firms are those with income before extraordinary 
items less than zero (greater than zero).  The initial sample consists of 144,765 loss (468,384 profit) firm-quarter observations, spanning 1973-2015.  
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, using two-tailed tests.  The key experimental variables are 
bolded.  All variables are defined in the Appendix. 
54 
 
TABLE 9 
Sensitivity analysis: including growth variables in the Mishkin model 
 
  
Loss firms   Profit firms 
  Pred Sign Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Pred Sign Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Panel A: Grouping regression 
                
Intercept  0.083 (1.42) 2.621 (0.60)  –0.390 (11.83) –3.164 (1.10) 
SENT_Gt – –0.310 (3.99)*** –0.357 (3.27)*** + 0.090 (1.88)* 0.180 (3.38)*** 
Controls  No Yes  No Yes 
Adj. 𝑅2  0.132 0.235  0.025 0.147 
N   100 100  100 100 
Panel B: Monthly regression 
                
Intercept  –0.161 (2.92) 0.482 (0.26)  –0.327 (7.47) –5.544 (2.21) 
SENT_Mt – –0.181 (1.96)** –0.194 (2.19)** + –0.004 (0.06) 0.120 (1.78)* 
Controls  No Yes  No Yes 
Adj. 𝑅2  0.010 0.059  0.001 0.089 
N   312 312  350 350 
Panel C: Comparison between loss and profit firms 
      
  t-stat  
Grouping Without control variables: |Coeff (SENT_Gt)loss  | > |Coeff (SENT_Gt)profit|    (2.33) **  
 With control variables:      |Coeff (SENT_Gt)loss  | > |Coeff (SENT_Gt)profit|    (2.41) **  
Monthly Without control variables: |Coeff (SENT_Mt)loss  | > |Coeff (SENT_Mt)profit|    (2.11) **  
 With control variables:      |Coeff (SENT_Mt)loss  | > |Coeff (SENT_Mt)profit|    (0.05)   
 
This table presents a regression analysis of the relation between sentiment and the errors in investor expectations of earnings persistence using the 
dependent variable a1* – a1 calculated by adding six growth variables (book-to-market, quarterly abnormal returns, sales to assets, changes in sales 
to assets, capital expenditure to assets, and changes in capital expenditure to assets) in the forecasting and pricing equations. Panel A and Panel B 
present the results for grouping regressions and monthly regressions, respectively; Panel C examines the difference in the sentiment coefficients 
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between profit and loss firms.  Loss (profit) firms are those with income before extraordinary items less than zero (greater than zero).  *, **, *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, using two-tailed tests.  All variables are defined in the Appendix. 
 
